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EMERGING MARKET SPREADS IN THE RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL 




  This work examines how much of the variation in emerging market economies’ 
(EMEs) spreads can be ascribed to ‘country-specific’ factors rather than to ‘common’ 
factors, once the existence of an interaction between the state of macroeconomic 
fundamentals and global financial conditions is properly taken into account. By means of 
factor analysis we find that a single common factor is able to explain a large part of the co-
variation in EME spreads in the period January 1998-June 2008; in turn, the common factor 
can be traced back mainly to financial market volatility. Once we have controlled for a set of 
idiosyncratic macroeconomic fundamentals, the common factor turns out to be a significant 
determinant of EME spread variations in the recent period of financial turmoil. Finally, the 
interaction term between global financial conditions and the state of macroeconomic 
fundamentals plays a significant role in most of the countries, allowing us to show that, for 
some less virtuous economies, the negative effects of a worsening of global conditions have 
been magnified by weakening domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. 
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editing.   1. Introduction  
Since July of last year, severe turbulence has shaken the global financial system. In the 
advanced countries, economic activity has slowed significantly and the outlook is deteriorating 
rapidly. The emerging market economies  initially appeared to be resilient both to the financial 
turmoil and to the slowdown in the advanced economies, thanks to favourable cyclical conditions 
and stronger overall fundamentals than a decade ago. Recently, their resilience has been severely 
put to the test by a further deterioration in global financial conditions and a worsening global 
macroeconomic outlook. A number of emerging countries in Europe have already faced acute 
financial tensions and a possible credit crunch. Risks of further contagion have grown.  
This work examines how financial conditions in individual EMEs have been affected by the 
interaction of global and domestic factors during the turmoil, focusing particularly on sovereign 
bond spreads, which represent a more internationally comparable indicator of credit risk than CDS 
premia or local bond spreads;
(1) it then draws some implications for the risks faced by EMEs in the 
current situation. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts regarding the recent evolution (since mid-
2007) of financial conditions in EMEs. Section 3 describes the model developed to disentangle the 
common external from the idiosyncratic determinants of EME sovereign bond spreads during the 
recent financial turmoil. Section 4 analyses the results in depth and Section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of the pattern of risks for different groups of EMEs. 
 
2. A few stylized facts 
Spreads on emerging economies’ sovereign debt had reached historically low levels in the first 
half of 2007, at a time of ample global liquidity and moderate risk aversion. The EMBI Global 
Index, which had been gradually declining from a peak of 1,631 basis points on September 10, 
1998, reached a low of 150 basis points on June 1, 2007.
(2) More interestingly, since 2005 EME 
sovereign spreads had fallen well below the spreads on high-yield US corporates, often considered 
by international investors to belong to the same asset class (Chart 1), reflecting a perception of 
reduced sensitivity of EMEs to external shocks.  
From the outbreak of the financial crisis until early June 2008, the rise in EME spreads was 
fairly moderate. A broad range of markets worldwide began to experience heightened risk aversion 
and a sharp fall in liquidity; EME spreads started to rise, as did those of similar asset classes such as 
high-yield US corporates, but remained well below historical peaks.  
                                                 
1 The underlying bonds are targeted specifically at international investors and are traded in international markets, with 
legal and institutional features that are broadly similar across countries. 
2 The EMBI Global index, produced by JP Morgan-Chase, tracks total returns for US dollar-denominated debt 
instruments issued by emerging market sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities, such as Brady bonds, loans, and 
Eurobonds. Currently, the EMBI Global covers 191 instruments across 32 countries. 
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deepened and the downturn in the advanced economies proved more severe and long-lasting than 
initially expected. Over the summer, the rise reflected mainly the deterioration in the economic 
outlook for the main EME areas. While initially it had been expected that the adverse effects from 
the financial market turmoil would be felt mainly by the US economy and the countries most 
closely linked to it, such as Mexico and Canada, over time growth projections for other advanced 
economies and for emerging economies were also revised downward (Chart 3). In September and 
October, however, as the global financial turmoil became more acute, a direct transmission of 
financial stress from US and European financial markets put additional upward pressure on EME 
spreads. The EMBI Global Index rose by more than 300 basis points between early September and 
mid-October alone, reaching levels last observed in March 2003. 
Stock markets tell a similar story. After an initial phase of partial decoupling from developments 
in the advanced economies, from May on emerging market stock prices declined sharply (Chart 4) 
as global risk aversion increased and the economic outlook became gloomier. The overall decline 
was much larger than in the advanced countries (52 and 37 per cent, respectively, between early 
May and mid-October). The losses recorded have been particularly pronounced in emerging Europe 
and Latin America (65 and 59 per cent), wiping out all the gains made earlier in the year. The slide 
of Asian stock markets had started some time earlier – around October 2007; valuations in these 
markets are currently below the levels recorded in early 2006. 
Even after the latest increase, EME sovereign spreads have remained well below those on high-
yield US corporate bonds, indicating that markets have not lost sight of the underlying improvement 
inof fundamentals in many EMEs. Moreover, financial market participants seem to be taking 
account of country-specific sources of vulnerability. In fact, pressures on spreads have been 
particularly severe in countries with more volatile political developments (such as Ecuador, Russia, 
Ukraine, and Venezuela) (Chart 5, upper panel) and in those with wide and persistent external 
imbalances, often financed mainly through volatile portfolio capital flows (Chart 5, lower panel). 
The latter are primarily countries in Eastern Europe, but they also include Turkey and South Africa. 
To the extent that markets are able to discriminate across countries  more successfully than in the 
past, this may protect EMEs with better fundamentals from the risk of contagion. 
Nevertheless, the risk of a sharp decline of international private capital flows to EMEs – which 
peaked at over US$800 billion in 2007 – has increased significantly in the third quarter, as global 
de-leveraging is not only raising the cost but also reducing the availability of external financing for 
EMEs. Data on the activity of US mutual funds specializing in emerging markets show net selling 
of more than 40 billion of stocks since the beginning of 2008 (Chart 6), mainly concentrated in 
Asia. Issuance of stocks halved in the first half of 2008. As regards emerging market bonds 
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billion, from $139 billion in the first half of 2007) and indications are that it will come to an almost 
complete halt in the third quarter, together with the drying up of other sources of external financing 
such as syndicated loans. This is also confirmed by the sharp disinvestment by US mutual funds 
since July.  
The turnaround in foreign capital flows has been accompanied by increased pressure on 
exchange rates. During the summer, a broad range of EME currencies, which until then had been 
mostly appreciating against the dollar (in Asia and Latin America) or the euro (in emerging 
Europe), started to come under strong selling pressure (Chart 7). Exchange depreciations have been 
particularly large in Latin America. In a number of countries, even among those without explicit 
exchange rate pegging arrangements, major central bank interventions have limited the currency 
slide. 
Based on this evidence, some questions arise: first, how much of the worsening of EMEs’ 
financial conditions is due to “exogenous” or global factors? How much, on the other hand, can be 
attributed to domestic developments (in particular to a weakening of domestic macroeconomic 
conditions)? Second, when looking at differences in asset price responses to the common global 
shock across EMEs, to what extent have international investors discriminated among the latter?  
Have EMEs with weaker fundamentals been hit harder by the global shock than the others? 
 
3. An analysis of the determinants of EME sovereign spreads  
3.1. Methodology 
A simple model of EME sovereign bond spreads - a direct measure of a country’s 
creditworthiness extensively used by researchers and market analysts - is estimated to identify their 
domestic and external determinants. We first apply factor analysis to a sample of 14 EME sovereign 
spreads, with monthly data and for the period January 1998-June 2008. A single common factor is 
found, which is able to explain a large part of the co-variation in spreads.
 The common factor can be 
interpreted as a summary measure of global financial conditions. Individual countries’ spreads are 
then regressed on the common factor and on a set of country-specific macroeconomic variables. 
Having constructed a synthetic indicator of underlying vulnerability to external shock for each 
country (hereafter the vulnerability indicator), we also allow for possible time-series interaction 
between global financial conditions (summarized by the common factor) and countries’ 
macroeconomic fundamentals (proxied by the vulnerability indicator).
(3) 
                                                 
3 This extension improves upon a work by the same authors; see Ciarlone et al. (2008). 
  53.2. The common factor 
In the empirical literature, global factors have been proxied by a wide range of variables, used 
individually or jointly in different econometric specifications;
(4) it is generally found that these 
global factors represent economically and statistically significant explanatory variables for the 
dynamics of EME spreads. The approach chosen here instead uses factor analysis to identify the 
common force that drives the co-movement of EME spreads. By doing so, it should be possible to 
capture more information than by appealing simply to one - or more - of the variables used in the 
empirical literature. The common factor may be thought of as a summary proxy measure for the 
above variables, as well as for other less measurable events such as excess co-movement and 
episodes of contagion.  
The procedure followed to extract the common factor is described in Annex I. The sample of 
countries comprises Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela, whose EMBIG spreads are 
available for the longest time span. Monthly data are used to align the frequency of the financial 
series to that of the macroeconomic variables used in the second part of the analysis. The sample 
period runs from January 1998 to June 2008. The results are robust to changes in the country 
sample and the time span. 
We find that a single common factor captures a large share of the co-variation among the 
spreads of the countries included in the sample. Despite not having a precise economic meaning, 
this common factor presumably captures the portion of EME spread variability that reflects global 
economic and financial developments, rather than individual country developments. This hypothesis 
seem to be supported by the high unconditional correlation between the common factor and a 
number of financial variables, such as the level of long-term US interest rates, the slope of the yield 
curve, global stock market indices, and the VIX index, which is usually regarded as a good proxy 
for international investors’ appetite for risk (Chart 8).
(5) A more formal econometric procedure 
confirms that a significant relationship exists between the common factor and the VIX index.
(6) 
                                                 
4 The proxies used in the literature include the level of short- and long-term interest rates in advanced economies 
(mainly the US), as a measure of global liquidity conditions (Eichengreen and Mody, 1998a and 1998b; Kamin and 
Kleist, 1999; Arora and Cerisola, 2001; Ferrucci, 2003; Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz, 2005; Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 
2005); their volatility, as a measure of the uncertainty surrounding the path of monetary policy in advanced 
economies (Arora and Cerisola, 2001; Culha et al., 2006); the yield spread between low- and high-rated corporate 
bonds or US long-term Treasury bonds, as a measure of international investors’ appetite for risk (Ferrucci, 2003; 
Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz, 2005; Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 2005; Culha et al., 2006); the US stock market index, as a 
measure of a general market risk (Ferrucci, 2003); and the OECD leading indicator of economic activity, as a 
measure of growth prospects in advanced economies (Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz, 2005). 
5 The VIX index is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index and is a market estimate of future volatility; it 
is calculated as a weighted average of the implied volatilities of eight put and call options written on the S&P 500 
index. The VIX index is considered a good measure of international investors’ appetite for risk. 
6 The estimate is made using the fully-modified OLS (FM-OLS) developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) to address 
the problem of endogeneity and non-stationarity of the variables. 
  63.3. The model  
We start from a model widely used in the literature on EME spreads, i.e. the one originally 
developed by Edwards,
(7) but augmented with a term meant to capture the possible interaction 
between the state of a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals and global financial conditions. For 
each country in the sample,
(8) we estimate the following equation: 
ε β α α α + + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + = ∑ j j j t t t t Macro F IND F s 2 1 0       (1) 
where s is the log spread,
(9) F is the common factor, IND is a vulnerability index measuring the 
overall health of the domestic economy, Macro is a country-specific set of j  macroeconomic 
variables and ε is the error term. 
The macroeconomic variables are allowed to differ from country to country. A common set of 
potential determinants of EME spreads was tried in the country-by-country regressions alongside 
the common factor; only those that turned out to be statistically significant were retained (Annex 
II).
(10)  
The vulnerability indicator IND used to measure the state of the economy facing external shocks 
was constructed by taking the simple average of the standardized values of a small set of variables 
which, based on the economic literature, can be expected to capture a country’s vulnerability to 
external financial shocks. A detailed explanation of the procedure followed to construct the index is 
provided in Annex III. 
The country-by-country estimation was performed using the Phillips and Hansen FM-OLS 
procedure; all variables are recorded at monthly frequencies.
(11) Regression results for the influence 
                                                 
7 Edwards (1984) assumed that the spread between a sovereign bond yield and a risk-free interest rate, which is a 
function of the (subjective) probability of default assigned by international investors to a given country, is related to a 
set of domestic, as well as international, macroeconomic and financial variables that influence investors’ evaluation 
of the country’s creditworthiness.  
8 In addition to the 14 countries included in the factor analysis, the following ones have been added in the FM-OLS 
regressions: Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.  
9 Formulations in terms of logs are standard in the literature on EME spreads. With this formulation, it is implicitly 
assumed that a shock of given size to the explanatory variables will determine a certain proportional change in the 
spread, regardless of the spread’s initial level. The common factor is also extracted from log-spreads, as explained in 
Annex I. 
10 It seemed natural to take into account the stock and flow variables relevant for both domestic and external solvency. 
Moreover, adverse developments in the exchange rate, which entail an escalating burden of external indebtedness, are 
also expected to lead to higher spreads. Indicators of domestic solvency include the level of public debt (scaled to 
GDP); interest rates; inflation; the output growth rate; and government primary balances (scaled to GDP). Among 
indicators of external solvency the following are considered: the stock of foreign-currency denominated debt (scaled 
to GDP or to exports); the current account balance (scaled to GDP); and total debt service or interest payments on 
external debt (scaled to total external debt, exports or international reserves). In addition, the share of external debt 
with a remaining maturity of less than one year can be considered a proxy for roll-over risk. 
11 Variables with a lower original frequency were linearly interpolated. Although this is a widely used technique in 
empirical works, we recognise that it comes at the cost of imposing a (linear) model on the data generating process, 
which might not necessarily be valid. 
  7of the common factor (including the interaction term with the vulnerability indicator IND) are 
provided in Table A4 of Annex III.
(12) 
3.4. The results 
The common factor is found to exert a statistically significant effect on all the spreads of our 
sample: as expected, shocks to the common factor are systematically associated with variations of 
the same sign in yield differentials. This is well illustrated by the individual country figures 
reproduced in Chart  9. In each figure, the red line indicates the influence of the common factor 
(including its interaction with the vulnerability index), while the blue line indicates the overall 
model prediction, which also includes the effect of the country-specific macroeconomic factors. 
When the influence of the latter is favourable (it tends to lower spreads), the area between the two 
lines is shaded in blue; when it is unfavourable (it tends to raise spreads), the area is shaded in red. 
Finally, the black dots indicate the actually observed monthly spreads. The figures show that the 
common factor is usually the predominant influence driving large swings in spreads over time. 
However, country-specific macroeconomic conditions can occasionally account for significant 
departures of actual spreads from the values that would be predicted by the common factor alone.  
Overall, over the whole sample and as an average across all countries, the common factor 
accounts for 73 per cent of deviations of actual country spreads from their respective means, macro 
factors for 19 per cent, and residuals for the remainder (8 per cent). 
Although it has been estimated in levels, the model also does a reasonably good job of 
accounting for changes in EME spreads. Even at the highest frequency (i.e. month-to-month 
variations in spreads), on average over the whole sample, shocks to the common factor account for 
just over 50 per cent of spread variability (average across all countries); the share of total variability 
that can be attributed to the common factor is similar also at three-month and one-year intervals; 
however, the share explained by macroeconomic conditions, which is negligible for month-to-
month variations in spreads, rises to around 20 per cent for variations over one year.  
The influence of the common factor described above also includes the effect of the interaction 
between the factor itself and our vulnerability index, which is supposed to reflect broadly the state 
of each country’s fundamentals. For 16 out of 21 countries in our sample, this interaction turns out 
to be strongly statistically significant. According to the model specification outlined in paragraph 
2.3, the spreads’ overall sensitivity to a change in the common factor can be measured by the term 
                                                 
12 Regression coefficients for the influence of the common factor (including the interaction term with the vulnerability 
indicator IND) are displayed in the Table; the evolution of the spread’s overall sensitivity to a change in the common 
factor, which is time-varying according to the value taken by the vulnerability indicator IND, is shown in the Chart 
for each country.  
  8t IND ⋅ + 2 1 ˆ ˆ α α        ( 2 )  
which varies over time according to the value taken by the vulnerability indicator IND. The 
evolution of this vulnerability index varies significantly across the countries in our sample (Chart 
A1 in Annex III): for most Asian and Latin American countries, as well as for Russia and Turkey, it 
is generally lower in the latter part of the sample than at the beginning; by contrast, it tends to 
increase over time for a number of European EMEs, such as Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania. As a result, the model predicts that the sovereign spreads of the latter group of 
countries would be more sensitive to changes in global financial conditions at the outbreak of the 
financial turmoil in June 2007 than on average over the whole sample, while for most other 
countries improved fundamentals translate into reduced sensitivity.
(13) 
 
4. The impact of the recent financial turmoil on EME spreads 
We now turn to the analysis of how the sovereign spreads of the individual countries in the 
sample have been affected by the financial turmoil. By decomposing the observed changes in 
spreads (see Annex IV), we can isolate the effects of (a) changes in the common factor and (b) 
changes in the idiosyncratic component.  
Chart 10 shows the overall change in spreads (represented by the dots) in the period from June 
2007 to mid-October 2008, and how much of it can be attributed to changes in the common factor 
(represented by the purple bars)
(14) and to changes in the macroeconomic component (represented 
by the blue bars).
(15) The white bars indicate the residuals, i.e. the unexplained part of the overall 
change in spread. The chart suggests that the common factor played a dominant role as a 
determinant of the overall change in EMEs up to mid-October 2008: on average, over 80 per cent of 
the observed increase in EME spreads is accounted for by the change in the common factor. Across 
countries, the observed change in spreads over that period is highly correlated with the change 
predicted by the common factor.
(16) 
                                                 
13 Because spreads are expressed in log terms in the model, a given sensitivity implies a certain proportional change in 
the spread for a given change in the common factor. The corresponding absolute change in terms of basis points, 
however, obviously depends on the initial level of the spread. Since some of the countries that display a high spread 
sensitivity to the common shock (like Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania) had very low spread levels at the start of the 
turmoil, their high sensitivity need not translate into a large absolute change in the level of spreads. 
14 The effect of the change in the common factor shown in the chart includes the effect of its interaction with the 
vulnerability index.  
15 The period considered is partly out of sample; in fact, the model was estimated over the period from January 1998 to 
June 2008. In order to extend the model predictions up to mid-October 2008, the common factor has been 
recalculated to that date. However, since most macroeconomic variables are only available up to June, the values of 
the vulnerability indicator and of country-specific macroeconomic factors are assumed to have remained at their June 
levels for the following three months. 
16 The cross-country correlation coefficient with the change in spreads predicted by the common factor (including the 
interaction term) is 0.85. 
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for Poland and Bulgaria, the adverse influence of the common component during the period of 
turmoil was partly offset by the negative contribution of the idiosyncratic domestic component, 
reflecting the improvement in macroeconomic conditions during that period. By contrast, in most 
other countries the contribution stemming from country-specific developments was unfavourable, 
adding to the adverse impact of worsening global financial conditions. This was particularly true for 
countries in emerging Europe (i.e. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Romania). From the individual country figures in Chart 3 it emerges that around the time of the start 
of the turmoil country-specific macroeconomic factors were generally contributing to keep spreads 
low in most Latin American and Asian countries (the main exception being China)
 as well as in 
Russia,
(17) while they were less favourable (with either a neutral or a positive contribution to spread 
levels) in European EMEs and in South Africa. 
Country-specific macroeconomic conditions affect spreads not only via the country-specific 
macro component just described, but also via the sensitivity to the common factor, which reflects 
each country’s vulnerability and can vary over time. In Chart 11 the effect of the common factor 
(already shown in Chart 4) is further decomposed into a) the effect that would have prevailed if the 
country’s sensitivity to the common factor had been equal to the average over the whole sample (the 
light orange bars) and b) the additional effect due to the difference between the estimated sensitivity 
during the turmoil and the average one (the dark orange bars). The latter effect is only displayed for 
the 16 countries where this sensitivity turns out to be well-captured by our vulnerability index.
(18) 
The chart shows that the spreads of a group of countries in emerging Europe (Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania), which at the start of the turmoil had poorer fundamentals 
compared with the historical average, were more sensitive to the common factor than would have 
been the case under average conditions. By contrast, several Asian and Latin American countries, as 
well as Russia and Turkey, had lower than average sensitivity during the turmoil. 
Overall, with the exception of a few countries, the model tends to under-predict the change in 
spreads over the period June 2007-October 2008 (the residuals in Chart 10 are mostly positive). A 
possibility is that the positive contribution of residuals to spread changes during the turmoil partly 
reflects a correction from unusually low spreads (unusually low risk premia) at the start of the 
turmoil. Another possible interpretation is that changes in actual spreads reflect in part an expected 
deterioration in underlying macroeconomic conditions, imperfectly captured by our sample 
macroeconomic data, which run only up to June 2008. The failure to take into account more recent 
                                                 
17 In the case of China, the country-specific macroeconomic factors that contributed to higher spreads around the start of 
the turmoil were higher-than-average domestic interest rates and short-term external debt as a percentage of total 
external debt.  
18 Therefore, estimates are not available for Slovakia, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and the Philippines.  
  10developments may have biased our results especially for commodity exporter countries in Latin 
America and Russia; in fact, as a result of the sharp decline in primary product prices since last 
July, conditions in the latter countries have started to deteriorate, making our results appear too 
sanguine. 
 
5. Main conclusions and assessment of current risks  
The analysis presented in the previous section shows that a common factor, which captures not 
only changes in global financial conditions but also the associated effects on the world economy, 
accounts for a large part (over 80 per cent) of the increase in EME spreads during the turmoil. Thus, 
EMEs as a whole are fairly exposed to the deterioration in global conditions.  
In addition, country-specific macroeconomic developments have also played a role during the 
financial turmoil, both as a separate source of shocks and by influencing the sensitivity of individual 
country’s to the common factor. Based on our analysis, we can tentatively separate the sample 
countries into three groups, according to their different degree of resilience.  
A number of countries, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, were relatively more vulnerable 
to the global shock and have been already affected quite severely. The negative effects have come 
from two sources: i) deteriorated fundamental conditions (especially external imbalances) already at 
the start of the turmoil, which increased their sensitivity to the external shock (this applies in 
particular to Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, Romania); and ii) the subsequent 
unfavourable evolution of macroeconomic conditions during the turmoil (particularly in Latvia and 
Ukraine), which further added to financial tensions.
(19)  
In a number of Asian countries (such as Malaysia and China), as well as in a few other large 
countries (Russia, Turkey), the impact of the global shock was initially contained due to sounder 
fundamentals. The subsequent evolution of macroeconomic conditions has in general been broadly 
neutral (only slightly unfavourable in Russia), at least up to last June.    
In a number of countries in Latin America (which include Brazil), during the twelve months 
since the start of the financial turmoil macroeconomic conditions evolved favourably, thus 
counteracting the adverse impact of the global shock. This favourable effect was largely connected 
with the surge in commodity prices, especially in the first half of 2008, which lifted export revenues 
and supported economic growth. However, in view of the sharp decline in commodity prices since 
July (especially of oil and metals, which tend to react to the global cycle), this influence may 
already have started to reverse.  
                                                 
19 At least until last June, only Poland and Bulgaria among Emerging European countries had experienced a favourable 
evolution of macroeconomic conditions during the turmoil.  
  11As we look forward we can draw some important implications for the assessment of risks. 
Prospects seem unfavourable for emerging European countries due to their high vulnerability to a 
reversal of foreign capital inflows. The long-term process of structural economic and financial 
integration within core Europe, coupled with exceptionally favourable global conditions up to mid-
2007, brought about very high rates of economic growth and financial deepening but also led to 
overheating and financial imbalances. A number of countries in the region are much more 
dependent on foreign borrowing today than they were at the beginning of the decade (Table 1). 
Based on standard measures of external vulnerability – such as the existence of large and persistent 
current account deficits (in some cases, well above 10 per cent of GDP over the last five years), the 
exceptionally rapid build-up of external financial liabilities, often denominated in foreign currency, 
during the favourable cyclical phase (foreign financial inflows were well over 15-20 per cent of 
GDP between 2003 and mid-2007), and the buoyant expansion of domestic credit – the situation in 
a number of countries (including the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine) 
appears potentially as vulnerable as that of some Asian countries on the eve of the 1997-98 financial 
crises.  
The emergence of financial tensions has so far been slower and less intense than during the 
Asian crises of 1997-98. In Central European countries with more stable macroeconomic situations 
(such as Poland and the Czech Republic) the relatively large weight of FDI in capital inflows and 
exchange rate flexibility may help to contain the effects of the external shock on the domestic 
economy.
(20) In several countries of the region, the large presence of local subsidiaries of foreign 
banks (on average, almost 60 per cent of bank assets are in the hands of foreign-owned institutions) 
may secure more stable access to foreign funding, given the presumption of a long-term 
commitment by the latter, than in the case of arm’s-length foreign borrowing.  
However, only a limited number of institutions, mainly European, are heavily involved in the 
local markets. Thus, there is a risk that, if liquidity shortages or balance-sheet losses were to 
threaten the solvency or constrain the action of the international banks involved, a common lender 
problem may develop for these countries. In the Asian crises of 1997-98 a similar problem occurred 
with the retrenchment of Japanese banks.  
A credit crunch due to an abrupt deceleration of foreign funding has already materialized in 
some of the most financially vulnerable economies in emerging Europe. In Hungary, despite efforts 
by the authorities to rein in the fiscal deficit, the economy is still very exposed due to the large 
current account deficit and external indebtedness; the rapid deterioration in financial conditions in 
                                                 
20 However, exchange rate depreciation tends to worsen private sector balance sheets due to significant currency 
mismatches. Moreover, in countries that are very open to international trade, exchange rate depreciation tends to be 
transmitted rapidly to domestic prices. In any case, the exporting sector is being hit by the ongoing demand slowdown 
in the euro area. 
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In the Baltic countries, where fixed exchange-rate regimes constrained policy actions and allowed 
large financial imbalances to emerge, the possibility of a hard landing has become quite tangible. In 
countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine domestic credit growth has been extremely rapid 
until very recently, and an abrupt deceleration is almost inevitable. 
The risk of contagion throughout the European region could be significant owing to the strong 
economic and financial interconnections. Although in recent years contagion effects in sovereign 
debt markets have come to be regarded as a thing of the past, given the broadly based improvement 
of fundamentals, it is unclear whether this conclusion still holds in the current, much more fragile 
state of the global financial system.  
While emerging countries in Latin America have so far withstood the global financial turmoil 
better than expected, downside risks have markedly increased for the economies of the region. 
Although the improvement of underlying fundamentals (with the notable exceptions of Venezuela 
and Argentina) has generally reduced the vulnerability to external shocks, the strong economic 
growth of recent years was to a large extent the result of favourable global cyclical conditions, that 
is strong demand, high prices for commodity exports, and low risk premia. Thus, the economies of 
the region could be rather vulnerable to the cyclical downturn in global industrial production and 
the weakening of commodity prices. Moreover, countries such as Brazil are fairly exposed to the 
financial turmoil because they are still highly dependent on international capital markets (though 
less dependent on foreign bank credit, given their diversified financial systems). Moreover, fiscal 
positions (which in many cases start from a rather pro-cyclical stance) could rapidly deteriorate, and 
in any case leave little room for manoeuvre to offset the adjustment in private demand. 
Although emerging countries in Asia are relatively dependent on net exports, and particularly on 
demand for manufactures by the advanced countries, they can be expected to be more resilient to 
the global shock. The high rate of domestic saving, massive foreign exchange reserves, and less 
internationally integrated financial systems will continue to mitigate the impact of volatile external 
financial conditions. As China has become an important outlet for goods produced in the rest of the 
region, its economic resilience appears crucial to the whole area. Fortunately, the Chinese economy 
is insulated from the impact of the global financial turmoil, and wide margins exist to support 
domestic demand through a fiscal stimulus.  
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  16Chart 4. Equity prices in advanced and emerging economies  








































































  (1)  Simple average of countries’ spreads, in basis points. 
   “Politically troubled” countries are Ecuador, Russia, Ukraine and Venezuela. 
“All others” are Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, 
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“Large current account deficit” countries are Bulgaria, Colombia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, South Africa and Turkey. 
“All others” are Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, 
Philippines and Slovakia. 
  18Chart 6. Emerging market funds: cumulative monthly net buying 











































Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research. 
* Estimated from weekly data. 
 
 

























Jan-07 Mar-07 May-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Nov-07 Jan-08 Mar-08 May-08 Jul-08 Sep-08
Brazilian Real Colombian Peso
Mexican Peso Peruvian Sol











































Other Countries: exchange rate vs. USD and EURO












South African Rand (2)
(1)  For Russia and Turkey, simple averages of exchange rates 
versus USD and EURO.  









































































Note: VIX index on the right scale, in logs. 
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Chart 9. Actual versus modelled spreads (continued) 
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Chart 10. Decomposition of changes in EME spreads during the turmoil: common vs. 





















Source: Authors’ calculations. 
(1)  The numbers represent differences in logs. The scale of the vertical axis indicates how many times the spread has 
increased between June 2007 and October 2008. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
(1)  The numbers represent differences in logs. The scale of the vertical axis indicates how many times the spread has 
increased between June 2007 and October 2008. 
(2)  Effect of the common factor that would have prevailed if sensitivity to it had been equal to the average over the 
whole sample. 
  26Annex I: The common factor 
The first step in factor analysis is to estimate the latent factors by calculating the eigenvalues 
associated with the correlation matrix of EME spreads. The number of significant common factors 
is then chosen by retaining as many as necessary to explain a significant share of the total 
correlation of the spread series. The sample of countries included in the factor analysis comprises 
Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, Turkey and Venezuela, whose EMBIG spreads are available for the longest time 
span.
(21) Data cover the period January 1998-June 2008 and are collected on a monthly basis in 
order to align the frequency of the financial series to that of the macroeconomic variables used in 
the second part of the analysis. Spreads are expressed in logs, a standard approach in the relevant 
literature. 
We find that a single common factor captures a large share of the co-variation among the 
spreads of the countries included in the sample (Table A1). This common factor, despite not having 
a precise economic meaning, can be considered a determinant of the variability of EME sovereign 
yield differentials that reflects international economic and financial developments, rather than 
individual country developments. A preliminary confirmation of this hypothesis is provided by the 
high unconditional correlation between the common factor and a number of financial variables, 
such as the level of US long-term interest rates, the slope of the US yield curve, global stock market 
indices, and the VIX index, which can be taken as a measure of international investors’ appetite for 
risk (Table A2). A more formal econometric procedure
(22) confirms that a significant relationship 








                                                 
21 The results of the factor analysis are robust to a change in the sample of countries and in the time span. The common 
factor has been recalculated adding other countries with shorter EMBIG series (i.e. Hungary and South Africa), or 
countries for which an EMBIG series is not available. In these cases (i.e. Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Slovakia), 
spreads are calculated on a single ten-year sovereign bond. In all these cases, the pattern of the estimated common 
factor remains basically the same. 
22 The estimate is made using the fully-modified OLS (FM-OLS) developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) to address 
the problem of endogeneity and non-stationarity of the variables. 
  27Table A1. Results of factor analysis 
(monthly observations; Jan. 1998- Jun. 2008) 
 
Country  Factor 
loading  Uniqueness Communality  Country  Factor 
loading  Uniqueness Communality 
Brazil 0.90 0.19  0.81  Peru  0.95  0.10  0.90 
Bulgaria 0.96  0.09  0.91 Philippines 0.77  0.41  0.59 
China 0.77 0.41  0.59  Poland  0.93  0.14  0.86 
Colombia 0.90  0.20  0.80 Russia  0.93  0.13  0.87 
Ecuador 0.80  0.37  0.63  South Africa  0.95  0.09  0.91 
Malaysia 0.92  0.15  0.85 Turkey 0.89  0.20  0.80 
Mexico 0.96  0.07  0.93  Venezuela 0.90  0.19  0.81 
            




Table A2. Correlation between the common factor and global financial 
conditions 
   
US ten-year Treasury yield  0.39 
(*) 
US three-month Treasury yield  0.06 
Slope yield curve 
(23) 0.15 
   
VIX Index  0.74 
(*) 
S&P 500  -0.32 
FTSE 100  -0.09 
Nasdaq -0.07 
   
Commodities -0.85 
(*) 
Note: yields on ten-year and three-month Treasuries are expressed in levels; all other variables are 
expressed in logs. 
(*) Significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level. 
 
 
Table A3. Fully modified OLS estimates: the common factor 
(dependent variable: common factor; estimation period Jan. 1998-Jun. 2008; monthly data) 
Regressor Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistics  P-value 
        
Constant 1.35  1.27  1.06  0.29 
VIX Index  1.61  0.22  7.15  0.00 
Commodities -1.21  0.15  -7.78  0.00 
Note: asymptotic standard errors; the FM-OLS estimates have been calculated using Bartlett weights with truncation lag k=6; we 
have also performed the same estimation procedure with different lag structures (i.e. with k=1 and k=12), obtaining very similar 
results (available from the authors upon request). 
 
                                                 
23 The slope of the yield curve is calculated as the difference between the daily yields on ten-year and three-month 
Treasuries. It is often used as a proxy for expected future growth: an increase in the slope of the yield curve is, in fact, 
associated with more optimistic expectations from international investors. 
  28Annex II: Idiosyncratic factors affecting EME spreads 




Country Macroeconomic  fundamentals 
America  Brazil   reserves over short-term debt (-); government net debt over GDP (+); primary balance 
over GDP (-); interest rates (+) 
 
Colombia   government net debt over GDP (+) 
 
Ecuador   real GDP growth rate (-); reserves over GDP (-) 
 
Mexico   government net debt over GDP (+);  
 
Peru   reserves over GDP (-) 
 
Venezuela  reserves over total external debt (-); primary balance over GDP (-) 
   
Asia  China  real GDP growth rate (-); short-term debt over total external debt (+); interest rate (+) 
 
Malaysia  real GDP growth rate (-); interest rates (+) 
 
Philippines  exchange rate (+); inflation rate (+) 
   
Europe and others  Bulgaria  reserves over short-term debt (-); total external debt over GDP (+) 
 
Czech Republic  government net debt over GDP (+) 
 
Hungary  government net debt over GDP (+); exchange rate (+); short-term debt over total 
external debt (+) 
 
Latvia  real GDP growth rate (-); current account balance over GDP (-) 
 
Lithuania  current account balance over GDP (-); interest rate (+); short-term debt over GDP (+) 
 
Poland  interests payments over total external debt (+); current account balance over GDP (-) 
 
Romania   real GDP growth rate (-); primary balance over GDP (-); interest rates (+); 
 
Russia  total external debt over GDP (+); interest rates (+) 
 
Slovakia  reserves over GDP (-); current account balance over GDP (-) 
 
South Africa  short-term debt over GDP (+); current account balance over GDP (-) 
 
Turkey  reserves over total external debt (-); exchange rate (+); primary balance over GDP (-) 
 
Ukraine  short-term debt over GDP (+); government net debt over GDP (+); primary balance 
over GDP (-) 
 
  29Annex III: The vulnerability indicator 
The vulnerability indicator IND was set up according to the following procedure.  
The first step was the choice of the variables needed to build the indicator: we relied on a set of 
six variables which, based on the economic literature, can be expected to capture a country’s 
vulnerability to external financial shocks. On the one side, the ‘good’ variables, the increment of 
which exerts a positive (i.e. decreasing) effect on EME spreads: international reserves, current 
account balance and primary budget balance, all scaled by GDP. On the other side, the ‘bad’ 
variables, the increment of which exerts a negative (i.e. increasing) effect on EME spreads: total 
external debt, public debt and short-term debt, all scaled by GDP.  
The second step consists in the choice of a method to combine together the macroeconomic 
variables: for each country, the vulnerability indicator is made up in the same way, by taking the 
simple average of the standardized values of these six variables. More precisely, each of the 
variables (Xj ) has been normalized by its own range of variation so as to obtain a new series (xj ) 
ranging from  0 to 1. 
Formally: 
( ) ( ) j j j j j X X X X x min max min − − =  
The transformed variables have been  synthesized into a single index by calculating a simple 
average. To make the ‘bad’ variables consistent with the ‘good’ ones they have been standardized 
using the transformation (1-Index). By construction, an increase in the indicator signals an 
improvement in the above-mentioned fundamentals.  
Table A4 shows the values, for each country, of the estimated parameters for the common factor 
and for the interaction between the vulnerability indicator and the common factor itself. The sign of 
the latter coefficient is negative as expected.  
Chart A1 displays the evolution of the time-varying sensitivity to the common factor for the 
countries for which the interaction between the vulnerability indicator and the common factor 




⋅ + ⋅ =
Δ
Δ






  30Table A4. Interaction between the common factor and macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
 
    
Country 
α1  α2 
America  Brazil 0.39 
(*) - 
 Colombia  0.59 
(*) -0.28 
(**) 
 Ecuador 0.23 
(*) -0.31 
 (***) 
 Mexico  0.77 
(*) -0.34 
(*) 
 Peru  0.49 
(*) - 
 Venezuela  0.47 
(*) - 
Asia  China 0.80 
(*) -0.28 
(***) 
 Malaysia  0.93 
(*) -0.49 
(*) 
 Philippines  0.36 
(*) - 
Europe  Bulgaria 1.27 
(*) -0.88 
(***) 
 Czech  Rep.  0.71 
(*) -0.36 
(*) 
 Hungary  1.50 
(*) -0.78 
(*) 
 Latvia  3.65 
(*) -2.91 
(*) 
 Lithuania  1.84 
(*) -1.36 
(*) 
  Poland 0.89 
(*) -0.45 
(*) 
 Romania  1.43 
(*) -0.53 
(*) 
 Russia  1.37 
(*) -0.47 
(*) 
 Slovakia  1.10 
(*) - 
 South  Africa  0.94 
(*) -0.35 
(***) 
 Turkey  0.92 
(*) -0.34 
(**) 
 Ukraine 1.45 
(*) -0.77 
(*) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: 
(*) significant at 1 per cent s.l.; 
(**) significant at 5 per cent s.l.; 
(***) 
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  32Chart A1. Time-varying sensitivity to global factors (continued) 
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  34Annex IV: Decomposition of change in spreads 
In this annex, we outline how to decompose changes in spread. We start from  , the spread at the 
beginning of the period: 
0 s
0 0 3 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 ε α α α α + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + = Macro F IND F s  
where s is the spread, F is the common factor, IND is the vulnerability indicator, Macro are the 
macroeconomic variables (see Annex II) and ε is the error term. The coefficient on the common 
factor (α1) and on the interaction term α2 can be found in Annex III above. 
Let us also assume that   is the spread at the end of the period:   1 s
1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 ε α α α α + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + = Macro F IND F s  
The change in spread  can be therefore computed according to the following steps:  s Δ
() ε α α α Δ + Δ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ = Δ Macro F IND F IND F s 3 0 0 1 1 2 1  
If the interaction term is not significant, the second term cancels out and the formula becomes: 
ε α α Δ + Δ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ = Δ Macro F S 3 1  
In this case the first term represents the effect due to changes in the global financial conditions, 
captured by changes in the common factor. The second term and the error term may be thought of 
as idiosyncratic factors to the extent that the common factor is correctly measured. 
 
If the interaction term is significant, the formula turns out to be slightly more elaborated: 
( ) = Δ + Δ ⋅ + ⋅ Δ − ⋅ − ⋅ + Δ ⋅ ⋅ + Δ ⋅ = Δ ε α α α α Macro IND F F IND F IND F IND F S 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 1  
= ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] = Δ + Δ ⋅ + − ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ Δ ε α α α α Macro IND IND F IND IND F IND F 3 0 0 1 1 2 2 1  
 
 
where IND is the average of the vulnerabilities indicator across the whole sample. 
Changes in spread can therefore be decomposed into four addenda with the following meanings: 
1 – The first addendum represents the change in spread due to changes in the common factor 
and the interaction term. The first part  ( ) IND F ⋅ + ⋅ Δ 2 1 α α  represents the effect due to average 
sensitivity to common shocks. The second part  ( ) ( ) [ ] IND IND F IND IND F − ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ 0 0 1 1 2 α  accounts for the 
interaction between the common factor and the vulnerability index. For a given shock, the 
further away is the vulnerability index from its long-term average the greater this component 
will be. 
2 – The second and the third addendum represent the change in spread due to changes in 
idiosyncratic components.  
2  1 
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